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ABSTRACT
Most trademark applicants and the attorneys who counsel them are familiar with the requirement
that they disclaim terms within their trademarks because those terms are descriptive or generic.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office’s authority to direct applicants to disclaim terms is
codified in the Trademark Disclaimer Provision of the Lanham Act, which provides examiners with a
great deal of discretion. The same provision has been interpreted as providing applicants with the
options of: taking conflicting positions, e.g., that the term is neither descriptive nor generic in the
context of their marks, when asserting common law rights; and pursuing rights without disclaiming
the term when there has been a showing of secondary meaning. But for all of the ease of
implementation and application, now, more than half of a century since codification of the
Trademark Disclaimer Provision, one should consider whether it is worth the effort and ask: Does
anyone gain by allowing examiners to require that applicants disclaim generic and descriptive
portions
of
their
marks?
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THE TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER PROVISION OF THE LANHAM ACT: IS
USPTO FLEXIBILITY WORTH LITIGANT AMBIGUITY?
SCOTT D. LOCKE*
When naming a product or a service, often marketing professionals gravitate
toward descriptive and generic terms because those terms can instantaneously
convey a message. However, unlike arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive terms,
descriptive and generic terms are disfavored by the trademark law because as a
policy, America has made a decision that in general it wants for all competitors to be
able to make use of them.1 In order to finesse the issue of how to build a strong
brand while using generic or descriptive terms, marketers often include them within
a brand name that has at least one additional element that is neither generic nor
descriptive.
Historically, trademark law wrestled with whether and how to recognize
trademark rights in these types of composite marks.2 In order to codify a resolution
of these issues, Congress included in the Lanham Act a grant to the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) of discretion to compel an applicant to
disclaim descriptive and generic terms while still allowing an applicant to register
the entire, also referred to as “composite,” mark at issue (the “Trademark Disclaimer
Provision”).3 For most applicants, when faced with a directive by an examiner to
disclaim one or more terms, the response is to comply without objection, because
compliance will usually be the quickest road to issuance of a registration.4 However,
applicants should beware; despite the current Trademark Disclaimer Provision being
in force for more than half of a century, courts are still struggling with the
significance of a disclaimer in a trademark registration. This article provides
background on the standards for requiring disclaimers, examples of the
* © 2018. Scott D. Locke (A.B., Biology, Brown University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania) is
a partner at the law firm of Dorf & Nelson, LLP, where he is the chair of the Intellectual Property
Department. Mr. Locke is a registered patent attorney whose practice includes counseling clients on
the procurement, enforcement, and licensing of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets.
1 See generally, Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 250 F.3d 25, 41 (1d
Cir. 2001) (discussing spectrum of marks); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d
4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (same).
2 See In re American Cyanamid & Chemical Corp., 99 F.2d 964, 966 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (discussion
history of evolution of disclaimer practice during period prior to enactment of Lanham Act).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (2017) (“The Director may require the applicant to disclaim an
unregisterable component of a mark otherwise registerable.”); Grayson O Company v. Agadir
International LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 318 n.7 (4th Cir. 2017) (“When a party applies to register a mark
that contains two parts, one of which is descriptive and therefore not entitled to protection, the
USPTO requires the party to disclaim exclusive use of that portion aside from its use in conjunction
with the mark.”); In re Louisiana Fish Fry Products, Ltd., 797 F.3d 1332, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The
PTO can condition the registration of a larger mark on an applicant’s disclaimer of an unregistrable
component of a mark otherwise registrable.”); In re Stereotaxis, Inc., 429 F.3d 1039, 1041 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (“The Trademark Office may require disclaimer as a condition of registration if the mark is
merely descriptive for at least one of the products or services involved.”).
4 The statutory discretion that is afforded to examiners, 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a), makes it unlikely
that an examiner will reverse his or her initial determination that a disclaimer is improper.
Further, because the discretion is codified, the cost of an appeal can be particularly intimidating.
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circumstances in which the USPTO requires them, and a discussion of the
ramifications of disclaiming a term in a trademark registration. It also explores the
inherently problematic nature of the current scheme under which the USPTO has
discretion about whether to issue requirements for filing disclaimers of terms within
trademark registrations.
I. PURPOSE AND PROCESS
When enacting the Lanham Act, Congress gave the USPTO the power to issue
disclaimers in the context of otherwise registrable trademarks.5 In its current form,
the Trademark Disclaimer Provision recites: “The Director may require the applicant
to disclaim an unregistrable component of a mark otherwise registrable.”6 Two
things about this statutory provision are notable. First, the use of the term “may”
instead of “shall” gives the USPTO discretion.7 Second, the mark must otherwise be
registrable,8 which means that it must contain at least one additional element that
alone or in combination with the descriptive or generic element(s) would be
registrable, or there is a combination of unregistrable terms that form a unitary
mark that differs in its connotation from the connotation of each of the terms when
considered separately.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) has summarized the
policy behind the Trademark Disclaimer Provision as follows: (1) it provides the
benefits of the Lanham Act to applicants for composite marks that have
unregistrable components, e.g., allowing them to incorporate descriptive terms with
arbitrary terms; while (2) it prevents applicants from claiming exclusive rights to the
descriptive or generic portions apart from the composite marks of which they are a
part.9 Thus, under this theory, when an applicant files a disclaimer, competitors are
free to use the descriptive or generic term by itself without legal harassment from the
registrant.10
Typically, during prosecution of a trademark application, an examiner issues a
directive to the applicant to disclaim a term, a phrase, or an element that is part of a
July 5, 1946, c. 540, Title I, § 6, 60 Stat. 429; Pub. L. 87-772, § 3.
15 U.S.C. § 1056(a).
7 Id.
8 Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Inter., Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1991) superseded in
part on other grounds by 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) as recognized by In re Wada, 194 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
9 Dena Corp., 950 F.2d at 1560. The latter benefit may be a solution looking for a problem. If
the composite mark contains both a generic and an arbitrary term, it is unclear under what
circumstances an applicant would be able to successfully establish rights covered by the registration
in the generic term apart from the arbitrary term.
10 Id.; see also Application of Hercules Fasteners, Inc., 203 F.2d 753, 757 (C.C.P.A. 1953) (“The
purpose of a disclaimer is to show that the applicant is not making claim to the exclusive
appropriation of such matter except in the precise relation and association in which it appeared in
the drawing and description.”); see also Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984)
(quoting Hercules Fasteners); Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd v. VME Products LLC, 2014
WL 2434517 n. 5 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (quoting Hercules Fasteners). One should also note that an
applicant is not permitted to disclaim all of the terms in a word mark. Pilates, Inc. v. Georgetown
Bodyworks Deep Muscle Massage Centers, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 75, 81-82 (D.D.C. 2001).
5
6
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composite mark.11 This request can be with respect to certain classes or all classes
within a multi-class application.12 If an applicant refuses to do so, the USPTO may
refuse to register the mark.13
An applicant may also voluntarily submit a disclaimer with an initial
application or at a later time even without the USPTO’s having issued a disclaimer
requirement,14 and the USPTO may accept the disclaimer even if it were
unnecessary.15 As a matter of practice, some applicants that file voluntary
trademark disclaimers do so because they make a calculation that not doing so would
only delay prosecution.
To notify the public of a disclaimer, the corresponding registration certificate
will recite: “No claim is made to the exclusive right to use ‘[disclaimed term(s)]’, apart
from the mark as shown.”16 However, as discussed more fully below, under the
current Trademark Disclaimer Provision, many courts have been reluctant to give
the inclusion of disclaimer determinative weight on this issue of the degree to which
a registrant can enforce its trademark rights.17
11 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (“[t]he Director may require the applicant to disclaim an unregisterable
component of a mark otherwise registerable”); Applicant of Franklin Press, Inc., 597 F.2d 270, 273
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (“The effect of disclaimer is to disavow any exclusive right to the use of a specified
word, phrase, or design outside of its use within a composite mark.”).
12 TMEP § 1213 (11th ed. Apr. 2017) (“A disclaimer may be limited to pertain to only certain
classes, or to only certain goods and services.”); see e.g., In re Nippon Electric Glass Co., Ltd., 2016
WL 356619, *9 (June 2, 2016) (recognizing that the examiner applied disclaimer to only four
classes); In re Coden, 2012 WL 1267928, *10 n.3 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2012) (applying disclaimer to
only one class).
13 Notably, when the Trademark Act of 1946 first incorporated a provision directed to the
issuance of disclaimers, the statute used the term “shall,” thereby mandating the issuance of
disclaimer requirements by the USPTO. TMEP § 1213.01(a). In 1962, Congress amended the
statute to use the permissive term “may,” which has been used to justify the greater discretion by
examiners. Dena Corp, 950 F.2d at 1559 (discussing 1962 amendment).
14 15 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (“An applicant may voluntarily disclaim a component of a mark sought to
be registered”); TMEP § 1213.01(c). See also In re MCO Communications Corp., 21 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1534
(Comm’r Pats. 1991) (applicant may voluntarily disclaim material that is registrable or not
registrable).
15 In re Cleaner’s Supply, Inc., 2003 WL 169796, *4 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2003).
16In general, disclaimers of individual components of complete descriptive phrases are
improper.
In re Wet Technologies, Inc., 2012 WL 3224708 *3 (T.T.A.B. July 20, 2012)
(“Unregistrable wording must be disclaimed in its entirety; words that form a grammatically or
otherwise unitary expression must be disclaimed as a composite”); In re Wanstrath, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
1412, *2 (Comm’r Pat. & Tr. Jan. 6, 1987) (“Disclaimers of individual components of complete
descriptive phrases are improper”). See also In re October Three LLC, 2016 WL 2939090, *3 (Apr.
14, 2016) (“If a unitary phrase consisting of individually descriptive components does not result in a
combination presenting something more than the sum of its parts, then the phrase is merely
descriptive as a whole, and must be disclaimed as a whole.”). But separate disclaimers of adjacent
components of a mark may be accepted when they do not form a grammatically or otherwise unitary
expression, and each of the components retains its separate descriptive significance. In re October
Three LLC, 2016 WL 2939090, *3; see also In re Prince of Wales International Business Leaders
Forum 2009 WL 4081684 *8 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2009) (“The simple fact that initial letters of the
words [in the mark GT GLASS TECHNOLOGY] correspond with the abbreviation does not mean
that they are joined as a unitary expression”).
17 See e.g., Kelley Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 291 (C.D. Ca. 1992) (noting
that disclaimer did not constitute waiver or estoppel). Prior to the Lanham Act, if an applicant
disclaimed certain subject matter as unregistrable, then the applicant and its successors in interest
were estopped from later securing registration of the subject matter even if those portions became

[17:305 2018] The Trademark Disclaimer Provision of the Lanham Act:
Is USPTO Flexibility Worth Litigant Ambiguity?

309

Examples of elements for which the USPTO will require the filing of disclaimers
are: (i) matter that is merely descriptive or misdescriptive of the goods or services or
matter that is primarily geographically descriptive of the goods or services;18 (ii)
components that are generic or that otherwise do not function as a mark;19 (iii) words
or abbreviations in a trade name that designate the legal character of an entity or its
family structure, unless the designation is used in an arbitrary manner and thus has
trademark significance;20 and (iv) unregistrable components of trade names or
company names.21
II. COMPOSITE MARKS AND THE SUBSET OF UNITARY MARKS
Trademarks that contain more than one element may be classified as composite
marks, and if the elements are inseparable, those marks may be deemed unitary
marks.22 Under the Lanham Act, composite marks, but not unitary marks, are
subject to the disclaimer requirement.23 Thus, many applicants argue against
USPTO requirements for disclaimers by taking the position that their marks are
unitary.24 Below is a discussion of guideposts that one may use in determining

distinctive or protectable under the common law. See Hercules, Fasteners, Inc., 203 F.3d at 757; In
re Canada Dry Ginger Ale, 87 F.2d 736, 737 (C.C.P.A. 1937) (noting estoppel).
18 TMEP § 1213.03(b) (11th ed. Apr. 2017); see also Grayson, supra n. 1; In re Wada, 194 F.3d
1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (NAFTA amendments rendered primarily geographically misdescriptive
marks precluded from registration); In re Jasmine LLC, 2013 WL 2951788, *9-10 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 5,
2013) (affirming requirement of deceptively misdescriptive phrase WHITE JASMINE); In re
Mumbai Mantrua Media Ltd., 2011 WL 5600313, *1 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 26, 2011) (noting requirement to
disclaim MUMBAI).
19 TMEP § 1213.03(a). See also In re King Koil Licensing Co., Inc., 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1048, *4
(affirming examiner required disclaimer of MATTRESS in mark THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS
as being generic).
20 TMEP § 1213.03(d); In re Toast, Four Corners, Inc., 2016 WL 3566143, *4 (T.T.A.B. May 24,
2016) (affirming requirement to disclaim INC.); In re Bone Yard Industries, 2012 WL 2024446, *2
(T.T.A.B. May 22, 2016) (“Words or abbreviations in a trade name designating the legal character of
an entity (e.g., Corporation, Corp., Co., Inc., Ltd., etc.) must be disclaimed because an entity
designation has no source-indicating capacity.”; affirming requirement to disclaim INDUSTRIES).
21 TMEP § 1213.04.
See e.g., In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 221 USPQ 364
(T.T.A.B. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 748 F.2d 1565, 223 USPQ 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming
requirement for disclaimer of PASTRY SHOPPE in mark MARTIN’S FAMOUS PASTRY SHOPPE
INC. and design).
22 In re DDMB, 2017 WL 915102, *3 (2017) (“For a composite mark to qualify as a ‘unitary
mark’ the elements of the composite must be ‘inseparable.’”).
23 Dena, 950 F.2d at 1560
Moreover, the language of 15 U.S.C §§ 1056 and 1057 incorporated the
various aspects of traditional disclaimer practice. For example, section 1056(a)
adopts the Commissioner’s policy of exempting unitary marks from the disclaimer
requirement . . . A unitary mark simply has no ‘unregistrable component,’ but is
instead an inseparable whole. A unitary mark cannot be separated into
registrable and nonregistrable parts. Because unitary marks do not fit within the
language of section 1056(a), the Commissioner cannot require a disclaimer.
TMEP §§ 1213.02, 1213.05 (11th ed. Apr. 2017).
24 See e.g., In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Nunn Milling Company,
Inc., 2017 WL 3773111 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 24, 2017); Nixalite of America Inc. v. Bird Barrier of America,
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whether a combination of elements presents a synergy that transforms them into a
unitary mark.
Unitary marks are marks that create a commercial impression separate and
apart from any unregistrable component.25 “The test for unitariness inquires
whether the elements of a mark are so integrated or merged together that they
cannot be regarded as separable.”26 Unitary marks can be identified by considering
the following factors: (1) whether the elements are physically connected by lines or
other design features; (2) how close the elements are located to each other -- whether
side-by-side on the same line; and (3) the meanings of the words and how the
meanings relate to each other and the to the goods or services.27 When asking
whether a mark is unitary, one should focus on how an average purchaser would
encounter the mark under normal marketing conditions and how that average
consumer would react to the mark.28
The recent case In re DDMB,29 provides an example of both how the issue of
unitariness arises and how the USPTO and the CAFC approach this issue. The
applicant had sought to register EMPORIUM ARCADE BAR and design.30 The
trademark examiner required that the applicant disclaim the term EMPORIUM.31
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) affirmed, noting that the term is
descriptive of video and amusement arcade services, bar services, and bar services
featuring snacks.32 The CAFC agreed with the TTAB’s conclusions, emphasizing
that: (1) the term EMPORIUM was descriptive of video amusement and arcade
services, as well as of bar services, and was supported by the Board’s evidence from
dictionaries and third party registrations; and (2) the phrase EMPORIUM ARCADE
BAR was not unitary because the elements were separable.33

Inc., 2004 WL 1576472, *2 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 2, 2004); In re Symbra’ette, Inc., 189 U.S.P.Q. 448
(T.T.A.B. Aug. 25, 1975).
25 In re DDMB, 2017 WL 915102, *3 (“A unitary mark must have ‘a distinct meaning of its own
independent of the meaning of its constituent elements.” (quoting Dena Corp., 950 F.2d at 1561)
(emphasis added). For a composite mark to qualify as a ‘unitary mark’ the elements of the
composite must be ‘inseparable.’); TMEP § 1213.05 (11th ed. Apr. 2017).
26 TMEP § 1213.05 (11th ed. Apr. 2017); see In re Savin, 2003 WL 21316775, *3 (Fed. Cir. June
6, 2003) (because a unitary mark has no unregistrable components, i.e., is inseparable as a whole, it
is exempt from the disclaimer requirements); Dena Corp., 950 F.2d at 1561
A unitary mark has certain observable characteristics. Specifically, its
elements are inseparable. In a unitary mark, these observable characteristics
must combine to show that the mark has a distinct meaning of its own
independent of the meaning of its constituent elements. In other words, a unitary
mark must create a single and distinct commercial impression.
27 Dena, 950 F.2d at 1561 (quoting TMEP § 807.13(a)); Eksouzian v. Albanese, 2015 WL
4720478, *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015) (quoting Dena); Sexy Hair Concepts, LLC v. Conair Corp.,
2013 WL 12119721, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“In determining whether a mark is unitary and creates a
single distinct commercial impression, USPTO examining attorneys and courts consider the
observable characteristics of the mark such as proximity, alignment, color and font, as well as the
connotative relationship of the mark elements.”); TMEP § 1213.05 (11th ed. Apr. 2017).
28 Dena, 950 F.2d at 1561.
29 In re DDMB, Inc., 2017 WL 915102 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 8, 2017).
30 Id. at *1.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at *3-4.

[17:305 2018] The Trademark Disclaimer Provision of the Lanham Act:
Is USPTO Flexibility Worth Litigant Ambiguity?

311

Below is an overview of how the USPTO approaches the issue of unitariness
with respect to different configurations of words and phrases.
A. Unitary Words
The issue of whether a word is unitary manifests itself in a number of contexts,
including when using: (i) compound words; (ii) telescoped words; and (iii) hyphenated
or otherwise punctuated words.
(i) Compound Words
A compound word is a word that is comprised of two or more distinct
words, but it is represented as one word. “If a compound word mark
consists of an unregistrable component and a registrable component
combined into a single word, no disclaimer of the unregistrable
component of the compound word will be required.”34 However, if a
compound word that is formed from two separate words, each of which is
descriptive, in a manner that suggests that each component retains
meaning, e.g., through different stylizations of descriptive terms in a
logo, then the combination of terms may be subject to a disclaimer
requirement.35
(ii) Telescoped Words
A telescoped mark is one that comprises two or more words that share
letters.36 In general, a telescoped mark is considered unitary, and no
disclaimer of an individual portion is required,37 unless each portion is
unregistrable. If, for example, a telescoped word is unregistrable
34 TMEP § 1213.05(a); see also In re EBS Data Processing, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 964, 966 (T.T.A.B.
1981); (“disclaimer of a descriptive portion of a composite mark is unnecessary . . . if the elements
are so merged together that they cannot be regarded as separate elements . . . for example . . . by
combining two words or terms, one of which would be unregistrable by itself”).
35 In re Wet Technologies, 2012 WL 3224708, 7-15 (T.T.A.B. July 20, 2012) (within stylized logo
of WETTECHNOLOGIES, disclaimer requirement of WET TECHNOLGIES was proper); see also In
re Medical Diagnostic Labs, LLC, 2016 WL 5866954, *3-4 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 22, 2016) (BRCAcare for
genetic testing deemed descriptive). When a disclaimer of a compound word is necessary, it may be
in the form of the two separate words. See e.g., In re Twin Bay Medical, Inc., 2003 WL 22513447, *2
(T.T.A.B. Nov. 4, 2013) (for compound word BARBLOCK, appropriate disclaimer was of BARB
LOCK).
36
TMEP § 1213.05(a)(i) (“e.g., HAMERICAN, ORDERECORDER, SUPERINSE,
VITAMINSURANCE, and POLLENERGY”); see also In re Genscape Intangible Holding, Inc. 2014
WL 2990398 *6 (T.T.A.B. June 9, 2014) (telescoped marks are considered unitary, but one must first
confirm that that the mark would be viewed as telescoped.); In re Visual Analytics, Inc. 2005 WL
1822538, *3 (T.T.A.B. July 27, 2005) (PDALAERT, DEMRALERT and AQUALERT did not require
disclaimers because each is telescoped); THOMAS MC CARTHY, 3 MC CARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 19:66 (5th ed. Dec. 2017) (“A telescoped mark is one that comprises two or
more words that share letters and is considered to be a ‘unitary’ mark with no unregisterable
portions for disclaims.”).
37 TMEP § 1213.05(a)(i); see also In re Renco Encoders, 2002 WL 1359374 n. 5 (T.T.A.B. June
20, 2002) (“Where a mark consists of two words telescoped into a single term, the term is considered
unitary so that disclaimer of one part of the term is not required by the PTO.”).
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because each element is a descriptive and/or generic term, but the
telescoped word is part of a composite mark in which there is an
additional element that is neither descriptive nor generic, then the
USPTO will require that the applicant file a disclaimer. 38
(iii) Hyphen or other Punctuation between Terms
A compound word may be formed by using punctuation between two
syllables or terms. If the compound word is formed by inserting a hyphen
between two words or terms, only one of which alone would not be
registrable, then no disclaimer is necessary.39 Further, the use of an
asterisk, a slash, or a raised period is analogous to the use of a hyphen,
and thus, if only one term alone would be unregistrable, then no
disclaimer is needed.40 By contrast, if the combined, e.g., hyphenated
term, is unregistrable because the terms remain descriptive, then the
USPTO may use its discretion to require a disclaimer.41

B. Unitary Phrases
In addition to whether individual words are unitary, there are situations in
which one must consider whether phrases are unitary. Trademark law defines a
phrase as “a group of words that are used together in a fixed expression”; “two or
more words in sequence that form a syntactic unit that is less than a complete
sentence”; and “a sequence of two or more words arranged in a grammatical

38 TMEP § 1213.05(a)(i) (11th ed. Apr. 2017); see e.g., In re Omaha Nat’l Corp., 819 F.2d 1117,
1119 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (affirming refusal to register FirsTier and design for banking services in the
absence of a disclaimer of “FIRST TIER,” in view of evidence that the term describes a class of
banks); In re Kaufman, 2014 WL 1827014, *1 (T.T.A.B. May 2, 2014) (“If a mark comprises a word
or words that are telescoped or otherwise misspelled, but nonetheless must be disclaimed, the
examining attorney must require disclaimer of the word or words in the correct spelling”).
39 TMEP § 1213.05(a)(ii); see also Ultimate Nutrition, Inc. v. Nxcare, Inc., 2008 WL 96116, *2
(T.T.A.B. Jan. 4, 2008) (“When a compound mark is formed by hyphenating two words or terms, one
which would be unregisterable alone, the mark is deemed unitary and no disclaimer is necessary.”;
mark CREATINE-DT2 does not need disclaimer); “X” Labs, Inc. v. Odonite Sanitation Serv. of Balt.,
Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 327, 329 (Comm’r Pats. 1955) (in TIRE-X, no need to disclaim TIRE). However,
the use of a hyphen frees only terms that are linked by it from the disclaimer requirement. See In re
Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum, 2009 WL 4081684, *8 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 19,
2009) (disclaimer required in mark IBLF -- INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LEADERS FORUM).
40 TMEP § 1213.05(a)(ii); In re Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum, 2009 WL
4081683 *7 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 19, 2009) (“When a compound word is formed by hyphenating two words
or terms, one of which would be unregistrable alone, no disclaimer is necessary.”); Ultimate
Nutrition, Inc. v. Nxcare, Inc., 2008 WL 96116, *2 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 4, 2008) (“When a compound word
mark is formed by hyphenating two words or terms, one of which would be unregistrable, the mark
is deemed unitary and no disclaimer is necessary.”); ‘‘X” Laboratories, Inc. v. Odorite Sanitation
Service of Baltimore, Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q. 327, 329 (Comm’r Pat. 1955) (requirement for a disclaimer of
“TIRE” deemed unnecessary in application to register TIRE-X for a tire cleaner).
41 TMEP § 1213.05(a)(ii) (if SOFT-TOYS is part of mark for stuffed animals, then disclaimer of
SOFT TOYS is necessary, and if OVER-COAT for winter coats is part of mark, then OVERCOAT
must be disclaimed).
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construction and acting as a unit sentence.”42 But “a phrase qualifies as unitary in
the trademark sense only if the whole is something more than the sum of its parts.”43
The issue of whether a phrase is unitary arises in a number of contexts,
including when using: (i) slogans, (ii) double entendres; (iii) marks that have
incongruity; (iv) sound patterns; (v) marks that are part of a display; and (vi)
elements to replace letters.
(i) Slogans
A slogan is a phrase that is brief and attention getting or a catch phrase
that is used as an advertisement, and one may register a slogan that is
used as a mark.44 In general, “[S]logans, by their attention-getting
nature, are treated as unitary matter and must not be broken up for
purposes of requiring a disclaimer.”45 But if the entire slogan is generic
or merely descriptive, or if it is merely informational, then the USPTO
will refuse registration of it as part of a word mark46 or require
disclaimer of it when part of a logo or design mark.47 When determining
whether a slogan is unitary one must consider grammar and
punctuation,48 which includes how the slogan uses verbs,49 prepositional
phrases,50 punctuation,51 and possessives.52
42
TMEP § 121305(b) (quoting MacmillanDictionary.com, search of “phrase,”
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/american/phrase (Jan. 31, 2012); THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1324 (4th ed. 2006); RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1460 (2d ed. 2001)).
43 TMEP § 1213.05(b); Dena, 950 F.2d at 1561 (EUROPEAN FORMULA and design for cosmetic
products not unitary because the elements were not so merged that they could be regarded as
separate).
44 TMEP § 1213.05(b)(i).
45 TMEP § 1213.05(b)(i); see e.g., In re Shachnow, 2015 WL 910207, *3 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 2, 2015)
(explaining that no disclaimers of WORLD were required in slogans THE WORLD'S TRAVEL
INSPIRATION ENGINE and TRAVEL THE WORLD ONE HOP AT A TIME because each were
unitary); In re Sears Brands, LLC, 2010 WL 5522986, *7 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 20, 2010) (no disclaimer
required for slogan SEARS BLUE SERVICE CREW).
46 TMEP § 1213.05(b)(i); see In re Ralston Purina Co., 2001 WL 473991, *2 (T.T.A.B. May 2,
2001) (cancelling registration for WORLD’S BEST CAT LITTER); In re 800-Gifthouse, Inc., 1999
WL 612964, *2 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 11, 1984) (refusing to register WORLD’S FAVORITE FLORIST); In re
Carvel Corp., 223 U.S.P.Q. 65, *4-*6 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (holding AMERICA’S FRESHEST ICE CREAM
for flavored ices, ice cream, etc., incapable of distinguishing applicant’s goods and unregistrable on
the Supplemental Register); In re Wakefern Food Corp., 222 U.S.P.Q. 76, *3-*5 (T.T.A.B. 1984)
(holding WHY PAY MORE! for supermarket services to be an unregistrable common commercial
phrase).
47 See e.g., In re Paradise Mountain Organic Estate Coffee, Ltd., 2016 WL 1045687, *7 (T.T.A.B.
Feb. 24, 2016) (requiring disclaimer of THE WORLD’S MOST SUSTAINTABLE in stylized mark).
48 TMEP § 1213.05(b)(iii) (“Grammatical structure and punctuation may play a part in the
analysis of whether a phrase or slogan would be viewed as unitary. Such considerations serve as
guidelines rather than dispositive factors and the weight to be given each depends upon the overall
meaning and commercial impression of the mark”).
49 TMEP § 1213.05(b)(ii)(A) (“The presence of a verb may indicate that a mark or portion of a
mark is a unitary phrase or slogan by linking a subject and an object, or by referring to something
that is ongoing, thereby creating continuity of thought or expression.”).
50 TMEP § 1213.05(b)(ii)(B)
Wording in a mark that comprises a prepositional phrase is generally
connected or unified by the preposition(s) in such a way that the elements would
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(ii) Double Entendres
This issue of a “double entendre” arises when a word or an expression
has more than one meaning, and by definition, it is unitary.53 If one of
the meanings of a double entendre is not merely descriptive of the
recited goods and services, then no disclaimer will be required for either
the mark or a component of it.54
(iii) Incongruity
If two or more terms are combined within a mark in a manner to create
an incongruity, then the mark is deemed unitary and no disclaimer of
non-distinctive elements is necessary.55

not be regarded as separable. In addition, marks comprised of prepositional
phrases often have the commercial impression of a catch phrase or slogan. In
some instances, however, marks contain distinctive matter followed by unitary
prepositional phrases that are informational or descriptive, and these
prepositional phrases are separable from the rest of the mark and must be
disclaimed.
51 TMEP § 1213.05(b)(ii)(C)
Punctuation may either unite or separate all or some of the words in the
mark. Where punctuation unites all the words, the mark or phrase as a whole is
likely unitary. Where punctuation separates some of the words, however, the
result likely indicates a mark or phrase that is not unitary, requiring disclaimer
or refusal of the unregistrable matter. Therefore, the punctuation in the mark
must be considered in connection with an assessment of the specific arrangement
of the words and the overall meaning and commercial impression of the slogan or
phrase.
52 TMEP § 1213.05(b)(ii)(D)
Generally, the use of a possessive form of a word in a mark does not, by itself,
merge the wording so as to create the commercial impression of a unitary phrase
or slogan. However, if the mark contains the possessive form of a word as well as
one of the considerations discussed above, this combination of the elements may
result in a slogan or unitary phrase.
53 TMEP § 1213.05(c); see generally Scott D. Locke and Laura-Michelle Horgan, Double
Entendres, Intentional Misspellings and Descriptive Marks, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (May 15,
2017).
54 TMEP § 1213.05(c)
A “double entendre” is a word or expression capable of more than one
interpretation. For trademark purposes, a “double entendre” is an expression that
has a double connotation or significance as applied to the goods or services. The
mark that comprises the “double entendre” will not be refused registration as
merely descriptive if one of its meanings is not merely descriptive in relation to
the goods or services.
(emphasis added);
See e.g., In re Tea and Sympathy, Inc., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d 1062, *3 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (THE FARMACY
registrable for retail store services featuring natural herbs and organic products and related health
and information services relating to dietary supplements and nutrition).
55 TMEP § 1213.05(d) (“If two or more terms are combined in a mark to create an incongruity
(e.g., URBAN SAFARI, MR. MICROWAVE, and DR. GRAMMAR), the mark is unitary and no
disclaimer of nondistinctive individual elements is necessary.”); In re Corporate Fuel Partners, LLC,
2010 WL 3501479, *2 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 27, 2010) (“Where a mark comprises two or more terms that
create and incongruity the mark is unitary and no disclaimer is necessary.”); cf. In re Millersport,
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(iv) Sound Patterns
The creation of sound patterns does not in and of itself render a mark
unitary. Thus, alliterative or repeated wording does not necessarily
make a mark unitary.56 However, in some circumstances “a rhyming
pattern, alliteration, or some other use of sound that creates a distinctive
impression” has been found to cause the mark to be unitary. In these
cases, the USPTO has not required disclaimer of any elements.57
(v) Display of a Mark
The USPTO will also consider how a mark is presented when evaluating
whether a disclaimer is necessary. If the visual display causes the mark
to be viewed as unitary, then the USPTO will not require a disclaimer.58
(vi) Elements Replacing Letters
Substituting one or more symbols for letters will not in and of itself
render a mark unitary.59 Consequently, even when a symbol is used for
2006 WL 2646005, *1 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2006) (GOLDEN GLOVE not incongruous and disclaimer
was required).
56 TMEP § 1213.05(e) (“Alliterative or repeated wording does not in itself make a mark
unitary.”). See e.g., In re Austin Brothers’ Beer Co LLC, 2016 WL 7646391, *3 (Dec. 13, 2016)
(alliteration of WOODY WHEAT does not render mark unitary); In re Ginc UK Ltd., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d
1472, 1477 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (finding the rhyming quality of the words ZOGGS TOGGS “does not
infuse TOGGS with any separate and distinct meaning apart from its generic meaning”); In re Lean
Line, Inc., 229 U.S.P.Q. 781, 782 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (holding LEAN LINE not unitary; “there is nothing
in the record to suggest that the mere fact that both words which form the mark begin with the
letter ‘L’ would cause purchasers to miss the merely descriptive significance of the term ‘LEAN’ or
consider the entire mark to be a unitary expression.”).
57 TMEP § 1212.05(e) (“In rare cases, a rhyming pattern, alliteration, or some other use of sound
that creates a distinctive impression may contribute to a finding that the mark is regarded as
unitary and individual elements should not be disclaimed.”). See In re Kraft, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 571,
573 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (finding LIGHT N’ LIVELY to be a unitary term not subject to disclaimer,
because the mark as a whole “has a suggestive significance which is distinctly different from the
merely descriptive significance of the term ‘LIGHT’ per se” and that “the merely descriptive
significance of the term ‘LIGHT’ is lost in the mark as a whole.”). Other evidence, such as
registrations of the mark for related goods and consumer recognition of the mark as a unitary
expression, may also contribute to a finding that the mark is unitary. Id.
58 TMEP § 1212.05(f) (“The visual presentation of a mark may be such that the words and/or
designs form a unitary whole. In such a case, disclaimer of individual nondistinctive elements is
unnecessary.”). See, e.g., In re Texsun Tire & Battery Stores, Inc., 229 U.S.P.Q. 227, 229 (T.T.A.B.
1986) (“[T]he portion of the outline of the map of Texas encircled as it is with the representation of a
tire and surrounded by a rectangular border results in a unitary composite mark which is unique
and fanciful.”); cf. In re Slokevage, 441 F.3d 957, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding trade dress
configuration of product design consisting of a label with the words “FLASH DARE!” in a V-shaped
background, and cut-out areas located on each side of the label, with the cut-out areas consisting of
a hole in a garment and a flap attached to the garment with a closure device not to be unitary where
applicant owned separate registrations for some of the elements and in view of the separate
locations of the words and design elements).
59 TMEP § 1212.05(g) (“when a design element replaces one or more letters (or a portion of a
letter or letters) in a word that is merely descriptive, generic, or geographically descriptive, this
combination of word and design element does not create a “unitary mark” if the word remains
recognizable”).
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a letter, an examiner may require the filing of a disclaimer.60 However,
“[i]f literal and design elements in a mark are so merged together that
they cannot be divided or regarded as separable elements, these
elements may be considered unitary. For example, where the design
element replacing a letter is merely one part of a larger design, the mark
may be unitary, and no disclaimer of the descriptive or generic wording
is required.” 61
III. DEFERENCE TO USPTO
As noted above, by statute, the USPTO has discretion in determining whether to
issue a requirement for a disclaimer.62 But the USPTO does not have the final word
as to whether its own actions are appropriate.63 Therefore, one must consider how
the courts will treat appeals from the USPTO, as well as during litigation, what
weight courts may give to a USPTO decision to issue or not to issue a disclaimer
requirement.
A. Appeals from the USPTO
The CAFC has held that the TTAB’s determination that a mark or term is
descriptive or generic is a factual finding that should be upheld unless the finding is
unsupported by substantial evidence.64 In In re Stereotaxis, Inc., the CAFC
elaborated that this type of evidence may be from any competent source, such as
dictionaries, newspapers or surveys.65 When challenging a determination of the
TTAB, the challenger must show that its proposed meaning would be the only one
accepted by the public.66 As a matter of practice, applicants rarely challenge these
requirements, and when they do file challenges, they often find difficulty in obtaining
a reversal of an examiner’s exercise of his or her discretion.
60 See In re Clutter Control, Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. 588, 590 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (disclaimer required
with two letter C’s were replaced with elongated tube like renditions of Cs in CONSTRUCT-ACLOSET).
61 TMEP § 1212.05(g)(ii).
If the design that replaces a letter within descriptive or primarily
geographically descriptive wording is itself merely descriptive or primarily
geographically descriptive, or is otherwise nondistinctive, the examining attorney
must require the applicant to amend to the Supplemental Register or seek
registration on the Principal Register under § 2(f) and to disclaim any generic
wording.
Id.
62 15 U.S.C. § 1056.
63 An applicant can appeal decisions of the USPTO to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and to a federal district court. 35 U.S.C. § 1071. Additionally, during litigation between
private parties, accused infringers frequently try to challenge the validity of trademarks.
64In re Louisiana Fish Fry Products, Ltd., 797 F.3d at 1335 (genericism is reviewed for
substantial evidence); In re Stereotaxis, 429 F.3d 1039, 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (review of
determination of descriptiveness is reviewed for substantial evidence).
65 In re Stereotaxis, 429 F.3d at 1042.
66 Id.
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B. Inferences during litigation
In an appeal from ex parte prosecution, only an applicant would challenge the
USPTO’s decision to require the filing of a disclaimer.67 When, however, a mark is
the subject of litigation, an applicant might ask a court to rely on the USPTO’s
failure to issue a disclaimer requirement as evidence that a mark is unitary or a
particular portion of a mark is neither generic nor descriptive. Similarly, a party
that is being accused of infringing a trademark that is the subject of a trademark
registration that contains a disclaimer might request that a court devalue the
disclaimed element or deem its existence as a type of waiver. Thus, often courts will
be asked to decide how much weight to give an action or inaction of the USPTO
under the Trademark Disclaimer Provision.
1. Treatment of terms within a registration
For matters of trademark prosecution, the TMEP is clear: “A disclaimer does not
remove the disclaimed matter from the mark. The mark must still be regarded as a
whole, including the disclaimed matter, in evaluating similarity to other marks.”68
Many courts have echoed this view.69 Yet there is a lack of consensus among the
courts as to how much weight to give a disclaimer.
According to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, “a decision by the PTO to
either require a disclaimer or not is merely a single piece of evidence in the court’s
overall . . . analysis.”70 Similar to the First Circuit, the CAFC has held that the
presence or absence of a disclaimer has no legal significance in a likelihood of
confusion analysis, but its presence can affect the weighting to be given to different
67 Because an applicant is permitted to file a voluntary disclaimer and an examiner must accept
it, 15 U.S.C. § 1056(b), there would be no circumstance in which the applicant would appeal the nonentry of a disclaimer.
68TMEP § 1213.10; see also Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enterprises LLC., 794 F.3d 1334, 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“While the Board may properly afford more or less weight to particular components
of a mark for appropriate reasons, it must still view the mark as a whole”); In re Nat'l Data Corp.,
753 F.2d 1056, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (technical effect of disclaimer in application has no legal effect
on the issue of likelihood of confusion); Grout Shield Distributors, LLC v. Elio E. Salvo, Inc., 824 F.
Supp. 2d 389 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2011) (it is inappropriate to give the presence or absence of a
disclaimer and legal significance wherein the USPTO’s practice of issuing them have been far from
consistent).
69 Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1530 (4th Cir. 1984)
While a composite term, including disclaimed words or figures, is to be
considered in its entirety in determining validity of a trade mark, it is a settled
principle of trademark law that the dominant part of a mark may be given extra
weight on the issue of likelihood of confusion;
Select Auto Imports Inc., 2016 WL 3742312, *12 (“Courts are particularly inclined to find
similarity when there is an overlap in the marks’ dominant terms, even the marks contain other
dissimilar words”); Juice & Java, Inc. v. Juice & Java Boca, LLC, 2015 WL 11233191, *3 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 25, 2015) (disclaimed material cannot be ignored in likelihood of confusion analysis); Tropical
Nut & Fruit Co. v. Forward Foods, LLC., 2013 WL 2481521, *2 (W.D.N.C. June 10, 2013) (quoting
Pizzeria Uno Corp).
70 Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 22; Minnesota Specialty Crops, Inc. v. Minnesota Wild
Hockey Club, LP, 2002 WL 1763999, *4 (D. Minn. July 26, 2002).
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portions of mark.71 Thus, to many courts, neither the action nor the inaction under
the Trademark Disclaimer Provision is determinative. However, if as the First and
Federal Circuits suggest, the presence or absence of a disclaimer is merely a factor to
consider, it begs the unanswered question of how much weight should be given to
that factor.72
Additionally, one should note that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has chosen to rely on USPTO action to a greater degree than the courts of appeals for
the First and Federal Circuits, holding that the filing of a disclaimer is a concession
by an applicant that a term is at least descriptive and indistinctive.73
Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC,74 provides a good example of
the framework of how courts look to disclaimers as one among many factors under
the dominant view as suggested by the First and Federal Circuits. In that case, the
plaintiff owned state and federal trademark registrations for the both the composite
word mark BOSTON DUCK TOURS and a design mark that consisted of the
company’s name and logo in connection with both sightseeing tours and clothing.75
For the sightseeing services, Boston Duck disclaimed the terms DUCK and
TOURS.76
The defendant (“Super Duck”) obtained a federal registration for the mark
SUPER DUCK TOURS in connection with tour services, but the USPTO required
Super Duck to register its mark on the supplemental register because the entire
mark was descriptive of its services.77 During ex parte prosecution with the USPTO,
the defendant (applicant) took the position that DUCK TOURS was not generic, but
during the litigation, it took the opposite position.78 During litigation, at issue was
whether the use of SUPER DUCK TOURS was likely to be confused with BOSTON
DUCK TOURS and if so, what effect both the plaintiff’s disclaimer of DUCK TOURS
and the defendants’ position during ex parte prosecution would have on the case.
The trial court issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining Super Duck from using
the phrase DUCK TOURS in association with its sightseeing services.79 That court
examined the marks in toto and concluded that the plaintiff would likely prevail on
71 In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058-59 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“it is inappropriate to give
the presence or absence of a disclaimer any legal significance”).
72 Scooter Store, Inc. v. SprinLife.com, 2011 WL 6415516, *8 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2011) (Boston
Duck court “did not discuss, however, the weight to be afforded a PTO examiner’s overall
determination on a mark’s distinctiveness.”). But at a minimum, the USPTO’s failure to issue s
disclaimer over a descriptive or generic term is not determinative. Humboldt Wholesale, Inc. v.
Humboldt Nation Distribution, LLC, 2011 WL 6119149, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (failure to do so is not in
and of itself a basis on which to invalidate a trademark.); see also Top Producer Sys. v. Software
Scis., 1997 WL 723049 (D. Or. July 21, 1997) (finding no authority that “gives the court the
jurisdiction to enter a disclaimer or cancel a mark based upon failure to disclaimer”).
73 Grayson O Company, 856 F.3d 307, 318 (4th Cir. 2017) (disclaimer was concession of
descriptiveness); Smith v. Entrepreneur Media, Inc., 2013 WL 2296077, *9 (E.D. Cal. May 24, 2013);
see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 3 MC CARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 19:65
(5th ed. Dec. 2017) (“A disclaimer of a part of a composite is a concession that that part is
descriptive”).
74 Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d 1 (1d Cir. 2008).
75 Id. at 8.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 22.
79 Id.
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the merits as to the issue of whether there was a likelihood of confusion, finding that
the phrase DUCK TOURS, which was common to the parties’ marks, was not
generic.80
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed, concluding that the phrase “duck tours”
was generic and noting that the decision by the USPTO to issue a disclaimer
requirement should not be given too much weight because it is discretionary.81 The
plaintiff tried to establish that DUCK TOURS was not generic by showing that in
numerous other applications, the USPTO did not require the disclaimer of those
terms.82 The First Circuit noted that those failures to issue disclaimer requirements
were not binding.83 The plaintiff also tried to take to the position that the defendant
was estopped from arguing that DUCK TOURS was generic because during ex parte
prosecution it took the contrary position.84 Here too, the First Circuit disagreed with
the plaintiff’s conclusion.85
The First Circuit then applied its likelihood of confusion analysis, and when
considering the similarity between the marks, noted: “we focus our inquiry, albeit not
exclusively, on the similarities and differences between the works ‘Boston’ and
‘Super,’ the nongeneric elements of each mark.” 86 The First Circuit acknowledged
that it was “[a]llowing ‘duck tours’ to largely drop out of the analysis,” and not
surprisingly concluded that the marks are “reasonably, although not completely
dissimilar.”87 The court then considered the other likelihood of confusion factors, but
what is clear is that the court was greatly influenced by the differences in the terms
in each party’s mark that was not the disclaimed phrase.88 Thus, the First Circuit
independently reached the same conclusion as the USPTO that within the plaintiff’s
mark, the elements DUCK TOURS were descriptive and thus the mark was not
enforceable outside of the context of its use in conjunction with the term BOSTON.
Consequently, one may posit: was there any value in the USPTO issuing the
disclaimer requirement?
Additionally, one should note that under the Fourth Circuit’s analysis the same
conclusion would likely have been reached, i.e., no likelihood of confusion. However,
because the Fourth Circuit would have treated the disclaimer by the plaintiff of
DUCK TOURS as a concession that the phrase is not distinctive, perhaps reaching
that same conclusion would have been a less cumbersome task. Additionally, an
applicant does not know in which jurisdiction it might wind up litigating its
trademark rights, and in the close case, the Fourth’s Circuit treatment of disclaimer
Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 10.
Id. at 21; Humboldt Wholesale, Inc., 2011 WL 6119149, *4 (“courts have suggested that
because the power of the USPTO to require a disclaimer is discretionary under the statute, and its
disclaimers practice over the years inconsistent, it is inappropriate to afford the presence or absence
of a disclaimer any legal significance”). Notably, Duck Tours had previously argued to the USPTO
that the phrase was not generic when trying to register its own mark. However, the First Circuit
held that Duck Tours would not be foreclosed from arguing during the litigation that the phrase was
generic. 531 F.3d. at 22.
82 Id. at 25.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 22-23.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 25.
87 Boston Duck Tours, 531 F.3d at 25.
88 Id.
80
81
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as a concession of lack of distinctiveness might make the difference between being
permitted to establish a likelihood of confusion and having waived the right to do so.
Furthermore, when a disclaimer is only one factor, defendants should not infer
that if disclaimed terms are the only term(s) in common, a trademark owner will not
necessarily be able to establish a likelihood of confusion. For example, in Cava
Group Inc. v. Mezeh-Annapolis, LLC,89 the plaintiff, Cava Group, Inc. (“Cava”) owned
and operated a restaurant in Virginia, Maryland and Washington, D.C. that served
Greek and Mediterranean food.90 Cava was also the owner of U.S. Trademark
Registration No. 4,059,522 (the “‘522 Registration”), which was a stylized service
mark CAVA MEZE GRILL for restaurant services featuring take-out Mediterranean
cuisine, wine, beer, and liquor.91 The mark claimed the colors, black, white, and
orange as features and the mark consisted of the CAVA in capital each letter of
which was in white, except for the V, which was in orange.92
The defendants (“Mezeh”) opened a Mediterranean restaurant called Mezeh
Mediterranean Grill. Mezeh stylized its logo to include the word “mezeh” in lowercase font with everyone-other letter colored white, while both E’s were in orange.93
Under the letters “eze” was an orange curve.94 Also, underneath the term Mezeh and
to the side was the language MEDITERRANEAN GRILL. 95
In considering the issue of the likelihood of confusion, the court noted that with
respect to the ‘522 registration, the words, MEZE and GRILL were disclaimed.96
Nevertheless the court deemed the mark as a whole to be distinctive, and when it
came time to consider the similarities between the marks, the court applied an antidissection rule, which requires consideration of the mark a whole and not the
component parts.97 Accordingly, the court considered the similarities between the
bold black, mostly white lettering with certain letters accentuated in some shade of
the color orange, a dark background, the of Mezze Grill/Mediterranean Grill below
the dominant word of the marks in smaller font, and the identical pronunciation of
the terms mezze and mezeh.98
The court also acknowledged notable differences, including: the word CAVA
appeared in all-capital letters in the ‘522 Registration, while “mezeh” was in lowercase as used by the defendants; the Cava Registration showed only one accented
letter, whereas the defendant’s mark had two accented letters; the ‘522 Registration
showed a slightly darker orange than the defendant’s mark; and the defendant’s
mark showed an arc below the “eze,” whereas no similar element existed in the ‘522
Registration.99 Ultimately, while acknowledging that the dominant term in the ‘522
Registration was not present in the defendant’s mark, the court concluded that its
absence was not entitled to conclusive weight and that a jury could conclude that the
Cava Group, Inc., 2016 WL 3632689 (D. Md. July 7, 2016).
90 Id. at *1.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at *4.
94 Cava Group, Inc., 2016 WL 3632689 at *4.
95 Id.
96 Id. at *7.
97 Id. at *7-8.
98 Id. at *8.
99 Cava Group, Inc., 2016 WL 3632689 at *8.
89
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marks were sufficiently similar to cause confusion, thereby precluding granting
either of the cross-motions for summary judgment.100
2. Family of Marks
Although intellectual property law often focuses on
predictability, section 1056(b) of title 15 is an exception, reciting:

consistency

and

No disclaimer . . . shall prejudice or affect the applicant’s or registrant’s
rights then existing or thereafter arising in the disclaimed matter, or his
right of registration on another application if the disclaimed matter be or
shall have become distinctive on his goods or services.101
This statutory provision has been interpreted to mean that the particular
registration to which it applies does not confer exclusive rights in the disclaimed
material, but rights in that material can exist independent of the registration.102
This has two implications.
First, a disclaimer has no effect on any common law rights.103 As a matter of
practice, most registrants that allege trademark infringement do so under both the
Lanham Act and under the common law. Therefore, at least doctrinally, the
disclaimer will not affect all causes of action. In practice, one can imagine that a
court might need significant convincing that a disclaimed term was generic or
descriptive for purposes of the Lanham Act but not for purposes of a common law
cause of action. Nevertheless, a trademark holder who is able to allege that, for
example, the composite mark has become unitary through acquired secondary
meaning might be able to thread the needle.
Second, a registrant can obtain a subsequent registration to a disclaimed term
or element if the registrant has shown secondary meaning.104 Therefore, an
applicant that has not informed the USPTO in one application that it disclaimed a
Id. at *9.
15 U.S.C. §1056(b); see also Delta Western Group, LLC v. Ruth’s Chris Steak House, 24 Fed.
Appx. 957, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (disclaimer in different registration by the same party would not
affect the construction of the registration at issue).
102 WWP v. Wounded Warriors, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 2d 970, 975 (D. Neb. 2008), appeal dismissed,
628 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2011).
103 Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 856 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1988) (disclaimer TRAVEL
PLANNER in registration did not deprive the registrant of any common law rights); Roederer v. J.
Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 866 (D. Minn. 2010) (disclaimer in one registration does
not affect rights in subsequent registration or at common law); In re Wanstrath, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1412
(Comm’r Pat. & Tr. Jan. 6, 1987).
104 Robarb Inc. v. Pool Builders Supply of Carolinas Inc., 1991 WL 335811 (N.D. Ga Oct. 31,
1991)
Although Robarb disclaimed the words CRYSTAL CLEAR in its earlier
registrations, the fact that Robarb received Registration No. 1,459,564 for
“CRYSTAL CLEAR” under provisions of Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act (15
U.S.C.A. Section 1052(f)) is prima facie proof that the mark has achieved a
secondary meaning in the pool clarifier trade,
(emphasis added)
affirmed 996 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1993).
100
101
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term in another application is not fraud on the USPTO.105 Additionally one can
easily see that given the plurality of factors of: different examiners processing
different applications, an applicant’s ability to vary the goods or services in its
listings, and the possibility that a descriptive mark or term can acquire secondary
meaning over time, a brand-owner could amass a portfolio of marks wherein the
same term within the same or different marks as recited in different registrations
would not consistently recite that the same term was disclaimed.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATION
The current version of the Trademark Disclaimer Provision explicitly recites:
“The Director may require the applicant to disclaim an unregisterable component of a
mark otherwise registerable.”106 Prior to 1962 the statute provided recited “The
Commissioner shall require unregistrable matter to be disclaimed.”107
In the report that the Senate issued when Congress enacted this amendment,
there is no discussion of why greater flexibility was given to the USPTO,108 and the
CAFC has noted that the change in language gave the USPTO more “flexibility.”109
However, typically flexibility is appropriate used when an Administrative Agency is
looking: to implement procedures for establish forms,110 to control costs,111 to manage
Quality Services Group v. LJMJR Corp., 831 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2011).
15 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (2017).
107 15 U.S.C. § 1051(e)(1) (1953); Dena, 950 F.2d at 1559 (“Besides deleting some cumbersome
language, the 1962 amendment also substituted ‘may’ for the mandatory ‘shall’ of the 1946 version.
This amendment gave the Commissioner more flexibility in implementing disclaimer policies. The
1962 amendment also allowed applicants to disclaim voluntarily.”); Application of Hercules
Fasteners, Inc., 203 F.2d at 755
appellant is not entitled to register the same unless descriptive and
unregistrable subject matter contained therein is disclaimed. Moreover, the
Commissioner of Patents has the right to enforce his requirement for disclaimer
by a refusal to register the mark in the event that the requirement is not met. In
re American Cyanamid, etc., supra. We think this is clearly in accord with the
mandate of section 6 of the 1946 Act.
108 S. Rep. No. 2107, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2845;
87 Cong. Rec. 20,455 (1962) (“Section 3 of the bill proposes to rewrite section 6 of the act relating to
disclaimers.”).
109In re Wada, 194 F.3d at 1301 (“The Commissioner is given broad flexibility in implementing
disclaimer policies.”).
110 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (2017)
Subject to the provisions of [15 U.S.C.] section 1058 of this title, each
registration may be renewed for periods of 10 years at the end of each successive
10-year period following the date of registration upon payment of the prescribed
fee and the filing of a written application, in such form as may be prescribed by
the Director.
15 U.S.C. § 1060(5) (“The United States Patent and Trademark Office shall maintain a record of
information on assignments, in such form as may be prescribed by the Director”); 15 U.S.C. § 1141a
The owner of a basic application pending before the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, or the owner of a basic registration granted by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office may file an international application by
submitting to the United States Patent and Trademark Office a written
application in such form, together with such fees, as may be prescribed by the
Director.
105
106
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timing,112 to make determinations of the sufficiency of evidence and authenticity of
statements, 113 to initiate adversarial proceedings,114 to select from a set options for
resolving adversarial proceedings,115 or to evaluate subjective issues such as
15 U.S.C. § 1141(d)
The holder of an international registration that is based upon a basic
application filed with the United States Patent and Trademark Office or a basic
registration granted by the Patent and Trademark Office may request an
extension of protection of its international registration by filing such a request
. . . (2) with the United States Patent and Trademark Office for transmittal to the
International Bureau, if the request is in such a form, and contains such
transmittal fee, as may be prescribed by the Director.
15 U.S.C. § 1141(i) (“The affidavit referred to in subjection (a) shall . . . (1) . . . (C) be
accompanied by such number of specimens or facsimiles showing current use of the mark in
commerce as may be required by the Director.”).
111 15 U.S.C. § 1113(a) (“The Director may waive the payment of any fee for service or material
related to trademarks or other marks in connection with an occasional request made by a
department or agency of the Government, or any officer thereof.”). Yet even here, Congress was
careful to micromanage the Director’s discretion, noting that the Director has discretion in allowing
multiple classes in a single registration, but only if there is no cost savings to the applicant in doing
so.
112 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(2) (2017) (“the Director may, upon a showing of good cause by the
applicant, further extend the time for filing the statement of use”); 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (“Such
applicant shall submit, within such time period as may be prescribed by the Director, a true copy, a
photocopy, a certification, or a certified copy of the registration in the country of origin of the
applicant.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1063(e) (“An opposition may be amended under such conditions as may be
prescribed by the Director.”).
113 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2017) (“filing in the Patent and Trademark Office an application and
a verified statement, in such form as may be prescribed by the Director, and such number of
specimens or facsimiles of the mark as used as may be prescribed by the Director.”); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051 (a)(4) (“The applicant shall comply with such rules or regulations as may be prescribed by the
Director. The Director shall promulgate rules prescribing the requirements for the application and
for obtaining a filing date herein”); id. at § 1051 (b)(4) (“a verified statement, in such form as may be
prescribed by the Director.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (b)(4) (“The applicant shall comply with such rules or
regulations as may be prescribed by the Director. The Director shall promulgate rules prescribing
the requirements for the application and for obtaining a filing date herein”); 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (d)(1)
Within six months after the date on which the notice of allowance with
respect to a mark is issued under section 1063(b)(2) of this title to an applicant
under subsection (b) of this section, the applicant shall file in the Patent and
Trademark Office, together with such number of specimens or facsimiles of the
mark as used in commerce as may be required by the Director
15 U.S.C. § 1058(b) (“The affidavit referred to in subsection (a) shall - . . . (C) be accompanied by
such number of specimens or facsimiles showing current use of the mark in commerce as may be
required by the Director”); 15 U.S.C. § 1051(f) (2017)
The Director may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become
distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant’s goods in commerce,
proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the
applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which claimed
distinctiveness is made.
114 15 U.S.C. § 1066 (“Upon petition showing extraordinary circumstances, the Director may
declare an interference.”).
115 15 U.S.C. § 1068
In such proceedings the Director may refuse to register the opposed mark,
may cancel the registration, in whole or in part, may modify the application or
registration by limiting the goods or services specified therein, may otherwise
restrict or rectify with respect to the register the registration of a registered mark,
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intent.116 Unlike these areas, the disclaimer provision of the Lanham Act is neither
procedural nor evidence weighting, and thus it is unique in how it provides discretion
to the Director for purposes of flexibility. Additionally, it is unclear why one would
want the USPTO to have flexibility in this area beyond its typical discretion in
applying the Lanham Act.
Further, even when giving discretion, in a number of areas, Congress has been
careful to specifically and explicitly limit this discretion so as not to affect
substantive rights. For example, the Director has discretion in establishing a system
for classifying goods and services. In this section, Congress explicitly noted both that
the Director is permitted to establish a classification of goods and services for the
convenience and Patent and Trademark administration and that the classification is
not permitted to limit or to extend the applicant’s or registrant’s rights.117
Similarly, the Director has discretion in accepting surrenders of registrations,
partial disclaimers of registrations, and amendments of registrations.118 When the
Director exercises any of these rights, the registrant’s rights are narrower or nonexistent relative to what they were prior to the exercise, and underscoring the
importance of not affecting the rights of members of the public, this provision
specifically states that if a disclaimer is accepted it cannot materially alter the
mark.119
Unlike in these two examples, the provision of the Lanham Act that allows for
the USPTO to issue disclaimer requirements does not contain any comparable
limitations to protect third-parties against improper extension of a trademark
holder’s rights. This lack of protection for third parties has the potential for the
Trademark Disclaimer Provision of the Lanham Act to be among the more
problematic provisions of Trademark Law. Yet the issue of improper use or misuse of
may refuse to register any or all of several interfering marks, or may register the
mark or marks for the person or persons entitled thereto, as the rights of the
parties under this chapter may be established in the proceedings.
116 See e.g., M.Z. Berger & Co., Inc. v. Swatch AG, 787 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“Congress expressly rejected inclusion of a statutory definition for ‘bona fide’ in order to preserve
‘the flexibility which is vital to the proper operation of the trademark registration system.’” quoting
S. Reg. 100-515 *24 2d Sess. 1988, P.L. 100-667 ): PTC Research Foundation, Future of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, 36 IEDA 383, 384 (1996) (discussing flexibility of USPTO with
respect to finances); S. Reg. 100-515 *24 2d Sess. 1988, P.L. 100-667 (to provide flexibility to USPTO
and the trademark registration system, Congress did not (i) include a statutory definition of “bona
fide,” (ii) place a limit on the number of applications an applicant could file contemporaneously, and
(iii) impose a prohibition against an applicant refiling an application to register a mark and thereby
extending indefinitely the period of time during which it could “reserve” the mark without making
use).
117 15 U.S.C. § 1112 (“The Director may establish a classification of goods and services, for
convenience of Patent and Trademark Office administration, but not to limit or extend the
applicant’s or registrant’s rights.”).
118 15 U.S.C. § 1051(e) (2017)
Upon application of the owner the Director may permit any registration to be
surrendered for cancellation . . . [and] may for good cause may permit any
registration to be amended or to be disclaimed in part, Provided, That the
amendment or disclaimer does not alter materially the character of the mark.
Under this provision, the Director accepts a registrant’s choice to surrender a registration or to
amend the registration. Id. With respect to amendments, here Congress was explicitly that the
amendment cannot alter materially the character of the mark.
119 Id.
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discretion by the USPTO under this provision also has the potential to be irrelevant,
because as noted above, most courts believe that the USPTO’s action or inaction
under this provision is not binding on them, regardless of whether a registrant
consents to a disclaimer, the registrant is permitted to file subsequent applications
and argue against the requirement, and none of the registrant’s common law causes
of action bound by a USPTO disclaimer provision. Thus, one must ask, why is there
a Trademark Disclaimer Provision of the Lanham Act, and why is it allowed to exist
with both flexibility in implementation and ambiguity in the significance of its
effects.
V. CONCLUSION
The conventional wisdom is that the Trademark Disclaimer Provision of the
Lanham Act provides the USPTO with flexibility as to whether and when to issue
disclaimer requirements. However, as noted above this license of the USPTO is
unique to this provision of the Lanham Act, and one should consider an alternative
trademark regime under which the USPTO no longer issues these types of
requirements. In such a system, the USPTO would consider whether composite
marks as a whole are registerable, which is what they do now. If a mark were to
contain a descriptive or generic term but as a whole be registerable, the registration
would no longer contain a denotation that the registrant would not assert rights in
the generic or descriptive term apart from the composite mark, but the registration
would still issue.
Because the registration is for the composite mark, any
enforcement should under this hypothetical system (and the current system) focus on
the entire composite mark. Although the applicant would not have made a
representation as to refrain from enforcing any descriptive or generic term, as a
practical matter, it could not do so, because the term would not be distinctive, which
is exactly the same standard as currently exists for causes of action under the
common law, for which disclaimers have no impact. Thus, consideration should be
given to relieving the USPTO of the unnecessary burden of issuing disclaimer
requirements.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, trademark applicants and registrants must
accept that their rights are granted under a regime in which the USPTO has
discretion whether to require and applicant to disclaim one or more elements of its
mark. Because the disclaimer can have the potential to affect rights during litigation
and the courts have not created a clear rubric under which to consider how to value a
disclaimer, before consenting to a disclaimer, an applicant should consider whether
the requirement was warranted.

